This article analyses key aspects of the regulation of entry and stay of spousal migrants in EEA member states. It shows that there are differences of regulation, particularly between states in Eastern and Southern Europe and states in Northern and Western Europe but, in most cases, the amount of divergence is limited. The article connects this 'family resemblance' to a broad concept of Europeanisation. Even where there is no binding legal obligation, European legal norms and the practice in other European states largely circumscribe what is possible.
Introduction: The Problem of Marriage Migration
In Europe, as elsewhere, many states find migration through marriage or equivalent relationship particularly problematic. Reconciling the desire to limit immigration, at least by certain types of immigrant, with responsibilities to citizens who engage in transnational family life is a major preoccupation. Unlike labour migration, the admission of family members is a function of the citizenship rights of those already within the state which cannot, in a liberal democracy, be denied recognition.
National laws thus provide for the admission of family members even when opportunities for labour migration have closed and family,including spousal, migration is now the dominant form of entry into many European states, representing around one half of legal migration into the EU in the early 2000s and one third in 2011. 1 States cannot easily select this large group of migrants for skills, education, cultural similarity or the other criteria applied to labour migrants but a trend towards greater restrictiveness has been observed in a number of states dating back to 1980.
2 Family migration is also the site of tension between supra-national and domestic legal systems although it is not immediately obvious why this should be. Supra-national legal norms generally exist increased. They present particular difficulties for states as the relationship may be well-established when brought to their attention and expulsionmay be difficult. Certainly, this type of case has featured significantly in the recent case load of the ECHR. 
The Control of Marriage Migration in Europe Europeanisation
First articulated in the 1990s, Europeanisation in its modern incarnation is a way to understand how national and sub-national governance is influenced by European legal norms and institutional frameworks. It is a multidimensional concept that requires careful definition and whose limits must be understood. 11 Radaelli distinguishes between 'vertical' and'horizontal' Europeanisation. Vertical
Europeanisation occurs when there is a clear demarcation between the EU level, where policy is defined, and the domestic level where it is 'metabolized'. 12 It is a two-way process however; member states form and are formed by new legal norms, as studies of the Family Reunification Directive show.
13
Horizontal Europeanisation is triggered by such factors as the diffusion of ideas and discourses. Outcomes are less directed and may be achieved using 'soft' forms of governance, such as the open method of co-ordination.
14 So far, the emphasis has been on the deliberate creation of new norms and policies but
Europeanisation has also an ideational character, allowing new policy frames to emerge which "integrate shared factual knowledge … and normative value-orientations". 15 This aspect is particularly significant in family migration. Shared forms of discourse and the example of other states can be an important means to legitimise national controls. Ideational Europeanisation is still embedded in the European institutional framework, which provides enhanced opportunities for the necessary interaction,but its outcomes are not necessarily the direct consequence of EU policymaking. 16 Europeanisation thus goes beyond the top-down imposition of legal instruments and seeks to capture the indirect, multiple and unpredictable ways in which national states affect and may be affected by the European Union. 17 It is a concept whose precise application is difficult to capture but its eminence in the recent academic literature indicates that it embodies an important empirical observation. The pre-flight relationships of refugees are recognised and they are exempt from some of the conditions in the Directive. 30 The sole prohibition in the Directive is on the entry of a second spouse and children in a polygamous marriage. 31 Refusal may only be on grounds of policy, public security or public health and there are obligations as to procedure, examination, access to education and employment, permanent residence and judicial remedy.
32
Many conditions are permitted under the Directive (although some cannot be applied to refugees).
States may impose a minimum lawful stay of up to 2 years before an application may be made and up to three years waiting period from application if the restriction relates to reception capacity (subject to a standstill clause). 33 They may also impose integration measures and require sickness insurance, sufficient resources to avoid recourse to social assistance (although an individualised decision must be made) and accommodation that is 'normal' for a comparable family in the same region and which meets health and safety standards. 34 States may also impose a bar on the entry of Arts 7(2), 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c).
spouses under 21, pre-entry integration conditions for children over 12 (subject to a standstill clause) and applications by children to be made before the age of 15 (subject to a standstill clause).
35
The permitted limitations, particularly those with standstill clauses, reflect the difficulties that states had in agreeing common minima and their desire to protect the status quo. 36 The Directive has thus played multiple roles in the development of family migration policy within European states. Its final form was a compromise between member states' interests both in preserving their existing controls and in ensuring uniform application. It has functioned as a template, a force for harmonisation, a means of liberalisation and a pretext for restriction. It has also been associated with wider policy exchange.
The Citizens Directive (2004/38/EC)
The Citizens Directive is not immigration legislation, its primary purpose being to codify Union citizens' Treaty rights of free movement. 54 The rights of entry and stay that attach to the third country national (TCN) family members of Union citizens are derived rights that depend on the exercise by the Union Citizen of the primary right of movement and residence. With a few differences, they mirror the rights of family members who are Union Citizens. Formally speaking, their third country status is largely incidental.
However, from a national perspective, these aspects of the Directive significantly impede the ability of member states to control the entry of family members who do not qualify under domestic laws.
As national regimes have contracted, the contrast has become starker and the extensive case law in this area reflects the struggles between Union citizens seeking the fullest possible implementation of free movement rights and member states resisting expansive interpretations. 57 The scheme prevented most migrants from marrying in the UK and was said to aim at preventing sham marriages. However, the government struggled during parliamentary debate to justify the scheme on these terms given domestic controls already in place and eventually acknowledged that a major aim was to inhibit marriages contracted with EEA nationals whose consequences could not be controlled by domestic law.
Variations in Member State Policies
Having established the ways in which the influence of EU law may be directly or indirectly felt, the article now compares the regulation of marriage migration in EEA states, considering the position of citizens and permanent resident sponsors but not migrants with more limited visas although, in some states, the position of the latter two groups may be assimilated. While this section sometimes refers to the Directive 2004/38, this is in order to assess whether the Directive has had a wider impact than its terms require; the article is not concerned with the application of the Directive to mobile EU citizens.
58
To facilitate comparisons and at the risk of concealing anomalies, countries are placed in one of four 58 This section of the article uses information drawn from a variety of sources including academic literature, research reports, official websites and NGO reports. Every effort has been made to ensure its accuracy but it is possible that some errors remain for which the authors accept responsibility. It was last checked on 5 September 2013, unless otherwise noted.
Southern and Northern Europe contain a mixture of states although fewer of the oldest or most recent. The general trend seems to be towards increasing the age requirement in Western Europe.
Minimum Age of Entry and Sponsorship
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, UK and Luxembourg have all raised their minimum age in the past ten years. 65 In 2009, the Dutch government proposed a further rise to 24 years which would have necessitated amendment of the Family Reunification Directive but this has not taken place. France (from 22 to 28 sqm for a couple depending on the region), Sweden (a one-bedroom flat for 2 adults without children or a bigger flat for a family with children, depending on the number and age of the children), or Hungary (6 sqm per person). 72 In some countries (e.g. France, Italy and Spain), local authorities play a role in determining the suitability of the dwelling.
73
Of the three countries not bound by the Family Reunification Directive, Ireland does not have a formal accommodation requirement while, despite recent restrictions, the UK still only requires the accommodation to be 'adequate' i.e. not overcrowded and conforming to minimum national standards. 74 Denmark however, has the most demanding criteria of all member states; at least 20 sqm or a maximum of 2 persons per room and a minimum 3 year tenancy.
75
In general, accommodation conditions seem to be least onerous in Eastern European states with the possible exception of Romania. The words "adequate", "suitable" and "normal" are barely used and there is little reference to national standards although some require the accommodation to be lawfully secured or registered (e.g. Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary). However, it may be implied that dwellings should be suitable for accommodation (Poland).
76
There are no instances of citizen sponsors being treated less favourably than permanent resident sponsor. The existence in Denmark of a more demanding criterion suggests that the Directive may act as a constraint on some states. However, the absence of detailed conditions elsewhere, particularly in Eastern Europe,and the moderate conditions in Ireland and the UK suggest that this in not necessarily the case.
Integration
Family migrants in many member states must now comply with integration measures. Measures involve the acquisition of language and civic knowledge, the level of which varies with the phase of migration and may apply at the pre-entry, renewal, permanent residence and naturalisation stages. Several European countries require a basic knowledge of the national language before entry (for example, Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, the United Kingdom), while others, for example the Netherlands, require knowledge of both language and society. 78 France also requires both but failure to meet the language criterion after following courses abroad is not a bar to entry, while not embracing basic French family life values could be an obstacle to family reunification. 79 The level of language knowledge required pre-entry starts at level A1 or below and increases as the spouse moves through the migration process. 
Income
Most states impose income requirements on sponsors. These however differ in the amount, the income sources which can be taken into account and the deductions that must be made so that precise comparisons are difficult. Under the Family Reunification Directive, states may require sufficient resources to avoid recourse to social assistance (subject always to an individualised decision). The Citizens' Directive permits consideration of resources only in respect of the selfsufficient and students (art. 7(1)).
In some Western European countries (Germany, Luxembourg, France) rules are more lenient for citizen sponsors than for permanent resident sponsors. 88 In Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK they are treated in the same way. 89 The required income ranges from social allowance (e.g. in Italy, or'minimum social salary for a non-qualified workers' in Luxembourg), to minimum wage (for example, the Netherlands for all sponsors, France for permanent resident sponsors) to the harsh income requirements introduced recently in the UK for both UK citizen and permanent resident Citizen sponsors in Southern European countries tend to be treated more favourably than permanent residents. There is either no subsistence requirement for citizen sponsors (Greece) or the rules for them are determined in a flexible manner (e.g. proof of sufficient economic resources for Italian citizens). 93 In contrast, permanent resident sponsors must meet certain quantified minimum financial obligations (In Spain for instance for a two-member family it is 150% of the monthly minimum salary, while in Portugal it is 12 times the minimum monthly guaranteed wage which increases with the size of the family), although these are relatively low (Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain, Malta).
94
In some Northern Europe countries, citizen sponsors are exempt from the income rules which apply to permanent resident sponsors (Finland, Sweden). 95 Iceland regulates all sponsors in the same way. 96 Denmark requires both citizen and permanent resident sponsors to be self-sufficient, not in receipt of public assistance for the previous three years and to provide security against future claims in the form of a bond. 97 Norway also does not distinguish between citizen and permanent resident sponsors in terms of income requirement and the amount is extremely high (in 2013 a yearly gross salary of NOK 246 136, about €30,500 although the average wage in Norway is also very high).
98
The rules in Eastern European countries either do not differentiate between citizen and permanent resident sponsors (e.g. Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia) or they provide better conditions for citizen sponsors (e.g. Poland, Romania, Slovenia). 99 Some countries apply the same rules for nationals and EEA nationals (e.g. Slovenia, Hungary). 100 The necessary incomes in many countries are linked to the minimum net wage (e.g. Romania); however some countries define these conditions in a more complex way (e.g. subsistence plus normal costs for housing (Czech Republic), or the social assistance limit plus accommodation costs (Poland)). The amount required increases with the size of the family in some Eastern European countries (e.g. Romania, Czech Republic, Slovenia). Income criteria are more often restrictive in Western Europe than in Eastern and Southern Europe although the Family Reunification Directive means there is limited variation. The Directive appears to be an inhibiting factor as the highest criteria in Europe are to be found in countries not bound by the Directive (the UK and the EEA state of Norway). This is the sole area of the Directive where a Court of Justice ruling has forced states to modify their policy. 105 Citizen sponsors are often treated differently to permanent resident sponsors but never less favourably and, in several countries, they are subject to conditions that reflect the Citizens Directive.
Fees
This section analyses fees charged to spouses for admission, residence and citizenship. Other fees, for example, for language and integration tests, document administration, stamp duties and medical examination fees are often charged but are not discussed here. In respect of initial entry, 12 states have very low fees (0-100 EUR), 106 seven states have low fees (101-200 EUR), 107 five states have medium fees (201-500 EUR) 108 and one state, the UK, has high fees (over 500 EUR) of 1227 EUR.
Data on fees for permanent residence was obtained only in 16 states. Out of these, six have very low fees, five have low fees, four have medium fees and only the UK has high fees. 110 Fees for naturalisation, including the cost of the citizenship application, any obligatory citizenship test and any further costs on grant of citizenship, were also considered. Out of 12 states where data was obtained, four had very low fees for citizenship, four medium and four high.
111
Most states apply fee requirements to both citizen and permanent resident sponsors but these are sometimes higher for permanent resident sponsors (for example, Ireland, Greece, Hungary, Italy and 110 Romania in respect of residence permits and Cyprus and Ireland in respect of naturalisation). 112 The
Family Reunification Directive makes no provision as to fees.
The majority of states with very low or low fees are in Eastern or Southern Europe and only Western and Northern states have medium or high fees (with the exceptions of Cyprus, which has medium fees for permanent residence and naturalisation, and the Czech Republic, which has medium fees for naturalisation). 113 Only Denmark and Poland provide applications free of charge. Denmark previously had very high fees but in 2012 abolished all fees for applications and appeals relating to family reunification. 114 Poland also abolished residence fees in May 2011. 115 The UK now has the highest fees, well above other states. 116 Latvia has dramatically reduced its fees in recent years. In 2008, residence permits cost 121 EUR and now cost only 21 EUR in a straightforward case. Citizenship costs just 28 EUR, with many paying the reduced fee of only 4 EUR. 117 Therefore, while the general trend has been towards higher fees, a minority of states have reduced or abolished fees in recent years.
Who may apply
The Family Reunification Directive states that family reunification rights must apply to spouses and may apply to further family members at their discretion. States may impose further conditions on applicants who are unmarried. 118 The Citizens Directive includes as a 'family member' a registered partner, where the legislation of the Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to 112 marriage and also requires member states to facilitate the entry and residence of a partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested.
119
Within the EEA, thirteen states allow only spouses to apply for family reunification, nine allow spouses and registered partners and only eight allow cohabiting partners to apply as well. 120 Icelandic regulations state that, where either party is under the age of 24, the relationship will be investigated as a possible marriage of convenience.
148
Denmark excludes marriages where the 'main' purpose of the marriage is to obtain a residence permit, using a list of factors similar to that in the Council Resolution.
149
There is thus a degree of similarity in many states, with convergence around the terminology used and factors identified either in the Council Resolution or the Family Reunification Directive which are often applied to those who are not governed by EU law. Convergence in this area is perhaps not surprising; there is a broadly similar cultural and social understanding of marriage which means that states are likely also to share their understanding of how a sham marriage looks (although that the failure of a wife to take her husband's name is regarded as suspicious in Estonia but not elsewhere suggests some variation). Given that sham marriages have been a concern in some states for many years, such provisions are likely to have a lengthy history in those national systems, providing the initial impetus for the EU measures. The converse is likely to be the case for newer member states and for those who do not have a long history of substantial immigration; they may have drawn inspiration from the example set at European level. Whatever the chain of causation, however, the result is a degree of resemblance in the regulation of sham marriages across the EEA. This is a complex area in which discretionary provision may not be evident in the formal law. There is not much consistency in provision although, in general, Southern and Eastern Europe are more generous.
Relationship breakdown

Concluding Discussion
The survey discussed in the previous section is a snapshot and does not fully consider the direction of regulation or growing political pressures in some member states, for example, Greece or Finland.
It also cannot adequately reflect administrative hurdles and delays reported, for example, in France and elsewhere. 161 Nonetheless, and subject to these caveats, several observations may be made.
The first is that the most controversial aspects of the control of spousal migration i. States bound by the Family Reunification Directive that wish to implement new controls can now only do so within the framework of what is already permitted so that, for example, elevated income requirements of the sort implemented in the UK or a minimum age of 24 as in Denmark are no longer possible. Of course, states which wish to limit migration will push the permitted exceptions as far as they can, as the Netherlands have done with their pre-entry tests. However, these may now be challenged not only in the Strasbourg court but, even if that has not yet happened, in the Court of Justice where the margin of appreciation is likely to be more limited. And they will still be the same type of control; a state that wished to introduce, for example, quotas could no longer do so even though Austria has been permitted to retain them (with a maximum delay of three years). The political difficulties of treating citizen sponsors less favourably than permanent residents on such an issue are evident; indeed the converse is more usually the case. Such distinctions might also be difficult to justify legally given the ever closer relationship between ECHR and EU law; if, as the Court of Justice observed in Parliament v Council, the Directive embodies article 8 principles then measures that discriminate against citizens are vulnerable to unfavourable findings under articles 8 and 14 ECHR. After all, citizenship is a factor which should strengthen rather than weaken an article 8 claim. In practice, it is difficult to envisage any state, whether or not bound by the Directive, discriminating between citizens and permanent residents in such a crude way and elements of the Family Reunification Directive seem to be present in the laws governing sponsorship by citizens in many cases. This is particularly marked in Eastern European states where accession coincided with negotiations for the Directive and, sometimes, the first rules for family reunification.
The Citizens Directive however has not had the same impact. Reverse discrimination under that Directive is a well-observed phenomenon. 163 The Citizens Directive is not immigration legislation even if it is sometimes treated as such. The distinctions it creates are directly connected to the privileges it confers and, given its expansive nature, states have more at stake in maintaining a conceptual boundary between the two regimes. Nonetheless, the Citizens Directive has had an effect on the laws in a few member states. As this article has shown, citizen sponsors and, occasionally, all sponsors are sometimes assimilated in national law to the position of EEA nationals under the Directive.
There is finally a more elusive cause of the family resemblance in regulation within Europe which is the shared understanding and practice between states. 
